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Abstract
We develop a simple test to assess whether horizontal spillover e¤ects from multinational
to domestic rms are endogenous to the market structure generated by the incremental entry
of the same multinationals. In particular, we analyze the performance of a panel of 10,650
rms operating in Romania in the period 1995-2001. Controlling for the simultaneity bias in
productivity estimates through semi-parametric techniques, we nd that changes in domestic
rmsTFP are positively related to the rst foreign investment in a specic industry and
region, but get signicantly weaker and become negative as the number of multinationals
that enter in the considered industry/region crosses a specic threshold. These changing
marginal e¤ects can explain the lack of horizontal spillovers arising in traditional model
designs. We also nd these e¤ects to vary between manufacturing and services, suggesting
as a possible explanation a strategic change in technology transfer decisions by multinational
rms as the market structure evolves.
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1 Introduction
The debate on the existence of productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI),
taking place through contacts between multinational (MNE) and domestic rms in a hot topic
in the international business literature. The growing important role of international capital ows
is also increasing the relevance of the debate in terms of policy implications: a conrming stance
is often taken as a justication of expensive incentive packages for the attraction of foreign
investors, while the evidence of negative e¤ects is likely to nurture protectionist arguments.
Observing the strong heterogeneity in motives, sources and timing of multinational entry, it is
actually disputable if all foreign entry is equally benecial for domestic rmsproductivity. As a
result, empirical studies have not come up with a clear answer to the question whether domestic
rms benet from foreign investors or not.
Given the potential heterogeneity of scenarios leading to a result of insignicant spillovers,
the aim of this paper is to provide a more precise measurement of the timing and direction of
the dynamic e¤ects of MNEsentrance. In particular, we develop a simple framework to test for
the existence of a threshold number of foreign investors below which horizontal spillovers are
positive, and above which there is a negative marginal e¤ect on domestic TFP (or the other way
round). If such a threshold exists for a positive number of multinational rms, we can conclude
that the concept of marginalspillovers becomes relevant, i.e. the combined e¤ect of positive
horizontal spillovers and competition from MNEs on domestic rmsTFP is not constant, but
rather varying with the progressive entry of new MNEs. The direction of variation (from positive
to negative or the other way round) is then assessed by looking at the signs of the coe¢ cients.
The prediction of a non-constant marginal e¤ect is tested on a rich panel dataset containing
information on some 10,650 local and multinational rms in Romania, with balance sheet data
available for the period 1995-2001, and rm-specic FDI data which start in 1990. As FDI
was virtually prohibited before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the sample allows us to
track MNEs from the very rst investment on, thus taking into account potential rst-mover
e¤ects. Anticipating our results, we nd that in Romania a positive threshold number of MNEs
exists, around which the impact on domestic rmsTFP changes from positive to negative,
thus highlighting the relevance of marginal spillovers. Moreover, we also nd marginal spillover
e¤ects to be industry-specic.
These results allow us to contribute to the analysis of MNEsspillovers under a number of
di¤erent perspectives. First of all, our ndings contribute in explaining some of the reasons
according to which traditional measures of horizontal spillovers identied by the international
business literature tend to be not signicant. Within the debate in the economics literature, we
are also able to provide some methodological contributions to the traditional specication of a
spillover regression: we control for and openly discuss a number of potential problems, among
which a comparison of di¤erent TFP estimates employed to control for the simultaneity bias
(Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003 vs. Olley and Pakes, 1996), and an analysis of the omitted price
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variable bias a¤ecting the same estimates. In particular, the latter bias is assessed through a
modied version of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) semiparametric algorithm of TFP estimation.
Our results also allow us to shed new light on policy recommendations for attracting foreign
investors. If marginal spillovers are relevant and, as it is the case for Romania, the e¤ects on
domestic rms are initially positive and then declining as more MNEs enter, then FDI attraction
policies should focus on industries where there is no or little foreign presence, since in these
sectors the positive spillover e¤ect is likely to (still) outweigh the negative competition e¤ect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some theoretical
background on the spillover debate and presents our working hypotheses. Section 3 discusses
the investment and TFP data employed in the analysis, while our methodology is discussed
in section 4. Section 5 analyzes the empirical results, performs some robustness checks and
presents some policy implications. Finally, section 6 concludes discussing the managerial and
policy implications of our ndings and providing some future lines of research.
2 Theoretical background
Pioneering empirical studies on sector-specic data (e.g. Caves, 1974) generally conclude that
there are indeed positive productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic rms. Aitken and Harrison
(1999) however criticize the methodology of the sectoral studies where positive spillovers were
found, on the ground of an endogeneity problem. They argue that foreign investments primarily
occur in sectors where domestic total factor productivity (TFP) is already high, thus leading
to a critical identication problem. Using panel data on Venezuelan plants and controlling for
xed di¤erences in productivity levels across industries, they nd no signicant intra-industry
spillovers from foreign rms to domestic rms. Other studies with rm-level panel data also
failed to identify positive spillovers from FDI, leading Gorg and Greenaway (2004), in their
extensive survey of this literature, to point out the inconclusive evidence emerging from several
empirical contributions on the issue1. More recently, Smarzynska Javorcik (2004), working on
Lithuanian rm-specic data, has been the rst to detect signicant positive spillovers arising
through backward linkages, i.e. generated through contacts between multinational a¢ liates and
local input suppliers (vertical spillovers). She nds instead no clear evidence in favour of either
intra-industry e¤ects (horizontal spillovers), or forward linkages.
The nding of positive vertical spillovers and no, or even negative, horizontal ones is in
general ascribed ex-post to the existence of "market-stealing" e¤ects: in the product market,
the domestic rms sales could be squeezed by the entry of the foreign competitor, leading to
a decrease in productivity if adjustment costs prevent inputs to be reduced accordingly or if
1For example, limiting our attention to transition economies, the studies of Djankov and Hoekman (2000) on
the Czech Republic, and of Konings (2001) on Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, either fail to nd a signicant
positive e¤ect or even detect a negative impact that multinational corporations generate on the performance of
domestic rms in the same sector. The situation is slightly di¤erent for developed countries, where some studies
have found evidence of positive intra-industry spillovers (e.g., Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter, 2002, using UK plant
level data).
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economies of scale are operating (Markusen and Venables, 1999); in the factor market, foreign
rms may attract the higher-skilled workers at the detriment of domestic rms, since MNEs
tend to pay higher wages (Aitken et al., 1996), thus providing another channel through which
the entry of a foreign rm may negatively a¤ect domestic TFP.
And yet, a precise assessment of these e¤ects has not been thoroughly analyzed in the
literature, due to the restrictive approach employed in the estimation of spillovers. In general
horizontal spillovers are measured by regressing, within a panel structure, some indicator of
productivity of domestic rms against an indicator of presenceof MNEs in the same industry2.
By looking at the average sign and signicance of this coe¢ cient across sectors and over time
(if employing a panel dataset), inference is then made on the presence or not of horizontal
spillovers and their impact on the performance of domestic rms. But a correct assessment of
potential spillovers e¤ects implies reckoning that the latter are ultimately driven by two sources
of variation: the (sector-specic) e¤ects of MNEsentry across the observational units, and the
change in the sign of these e¤ects over time. In other words, the marginal impact of MNEs on
the performance of domestic rms is not necessarily always positive or negative over time and
across sectors.
In particular, in a recent contribution Buckley et al. (2007) have shown that, across sectors,
there may exist an inverse u-shaped relationship between FDI and domestic productivity, so that
beyond some level of foreign presence spillovers begin to fall3. In a related study, albeit through
a di¤erent setup, Dri¢ eld and Love (2007) nd a similar level of heterogeneity across industries,
showing how di¤erent types of FDI in the United Kingdom have markedly di¤erent spillover
e¤ects, thus leading to insignicant results when these e¤ects are pooled together. Although
unable to test, the same Buckley et al. (2007) acknowledge that also the time dimension is
relevant in assessing spillovers. For example, the rst mover foreign investor might generate
positive spillovers for the domestic rms, which are o¤set by further entry only at a later stage.
On the contrary, the market-stealing e¤ect might predominate once FDI start to ow in the host
country, but, over time, the surviving local competitors might adapt their production processes
to the changing market conditions, with their TFP actually increasing as more MNEs enter due
to a selection e¤ect. It can also happen that a larger number of MNEs magnies the learning
opportunities for domestic rms, thus resulting in a positive impact on TFP growth rates over
time (Liu, 2006).
Finally, for the internalization of foreign knowledge, rms with a larger absorptive capacity
can benet more from foreign knowledge (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Therefore, in industries
where domestic rms possess more absorptive capacity, the positive e¤ect of inward foreign
2 In the horizontal case, the most commonly used indicator of MNEspresence is the share of MNEs em-
ployment over total employment within the considered industry. Such a practice might be itself subject to some
criticism, as discussed in the next sections.
3The authors point to the fact that sectors in which there is a high level of foreign presence tend to be those
in which Chinese rms are rather weak and have relatively low productivity. This causes the positive relation to
weaken across sectors and eventually become negative.
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investment on productivity will be stronger.
Based upon the previous considerations, we thus test two hypotheses:
1. entry of foreign multinationals has a non-constant impact when examining domestic pro-
ductivity in relation to the number of foreign multinationals that entered the domestic
industry;
2. the impact of foreign entry is stronger in industries where rms are on average larger.
As discussed before, both hypotheses are tested within an empirical model that allows for
a threshold number of foreign investments beyond which the impact on domestic productivity
changes sign.
3 The Romanian dataset
Our dataset is composed of domestic rms and a¢ liates of multinational enterprises operating
during the period 1995-2001 in Romania, as retrieved from AMADEUS. In the case of Romania,
the dataset reports information retrieved by the Romanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
the institution to which all rms have to be legally registered and report their balance sheet
data. In particular, the intermediateversion of AMADEUS used in this paper includes data
on 30,148 rms for Romania (2004 edition). See the Appendix for more information.
For every rm we have sought information on its location within each of the eight Romanian
regions and the industry in which these rms operate (at the NACE-2 and 3 level, as reported
in the Statistical Annex), as well as yearly balance sheet data on tangible and intangible xed
assets, total assets, number of employees, material costs and revenues (turnover). Moreover, we
have gathered information on the year of incorporation in order to distinguish between rms
which have always been operating in the considered time span and rms which have entered over
the period, thus controlling for a possible sample selection bias resulting from unbalanced panel
data, in line with the previous literature. Exiting rms are also considered, recording as exiters
those rms which do not report any information after a given year. Finally, we have included
in the sample only those rms for which detailed information on the ownership structure is
available: in particular, we have considered a rm as foreign if more than 10 per cent of its
capital belongs to a MNE, and domestic otherwise. However, we are not able to discriminate
between di¤erent modes of foreign entry (acquisition vs. greeneld investment)4, motives for
foreign entry (Dri¢ eld and Love, 2007), or FDIs country of origin (Buckley et al., 2002 and
2007).
Our nal sample consists of a total of 10,650 employable rms, 30 per cent of which are MNEs
in 2001, with entry and exit dynamics reported in Table 1. The distribution over time and across
4Spatareanu and Smarzynska Javorcik (2006) examine on a sample of Romanian rms whether the degree of
spillovers from foreign direct investment is a¤ected by the foreign ownership modality and share in investment
projects. We will discuss the issue of foreign ownership and its impact on our results in Section 5.
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industries of MNEs is reported in Table 25. In terms of representativeness, we have retrieved
from our sample a yearly measure of regional output, summing the individual rmsrevenues
operating in each region. We have then correlated these gures with the o¢ cial regional gures
for Romania, obtaining a signicant positive correlation of 0.836. As a result our rm-level data
seem to belong to an unbiased sample, being able to reproduce the actual evolution of output
in Romania.
[Table 1 and 2 about here]
4 Methodology
We have grouped the methodological issues related to the estimation of the relationship between
the presence of MNEs and their impact on domestic rms performance under three headings: the
estimation of the dependent variable (TFP), the regressors to include in the spillover regression,
and the model design. Our aim is to openly discuss all these issues, assessing their relevance
through di¤erent model designs and a number of robustness checks, in order to derive a precise
assessment of the impact they might have on the eventual detection of horizontal spillovers.
4.1 The estimation of Total Factor Productivity
In terms of calculation of domestic rm-specic productivity, we have initially followed the
standard approach of deating our balance sheet data using disaggregated industry price indexes.
In particular, we have employed a total of 48 NACE2 or NACE3 industry-specic price indices
retrieved from the Eurostat New Cronos database, according to the classication reported in
the Statistical Annex7. We have proxied output with deated sales, given the better quality of
these time series with respect to the ones reporting value added. The number of employees has
been used as a proxy for the labour input, and the deated value of tangible xed assets as a
proxy for capital.
We have then estimated productivity measures at the rm level within each NACE2 industry,
in order to correctly identify industry-specic technological coe¢ cients and thus allowing us
to correctly di¤erentiate between manufacturing and services8. Moreover, the estimation has
5 Information on the FDI stock up to 1994 has been retrieved from the PECODB dataset, a rm-specic
collection of 4,200 FDI operations undertaken in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the period 1990-
2002, also based on the intermediate version of AMADEUS (2003) and developed by ISLA-Bocconi University. In
terms of validation, the database is able to account for almost 70 per cent of the regions total FDI inward stock
in the early years of transition, as registered by o¢ cial statistics.
6Since our sample does not include all NACE industries (in particular agriculture), we have subtracted from
o¢ cial regional GVA data the output of those industries not present in our dataset. The correlation between our
sample and the o¢ cial regional data comprising all NACE industries is instead 0.73.
7The classication is known as Pavitt classication and allows to divide industries into di¤erent technological
patterns: economies of scale, traditional, high tech and specialised industries, plus services. The same grouping
has been used by Davies and Lyons (1996) to divide industries into high, medium and low sunk costs. As such,
the classication allows us to consider market structures, and hence prices, as relatively homogeneous within each
industry.
8 Imposing common input elasticities for rms belonging to di¤erent industries would in fact result in an
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been carried out via a semi-parametric estimation technique. In fact, using ordinary least
squares when estimating productivity implies treating labor and other inputs as exogenous
variables. However, as pointed out by Griliches and Mareisse (1995), prot-maximizing rms
can immediately adjust their inputs (in particular capital) each time they observe a productivity
shock, which makes input levels correlated with the same shocks. Since productivity shocks
are unobserved to the econometrician, they enter in the error term of the regression. Hence,
inputs turn out to be correlated with the error term of the regression, and OLS estimates
of production functions su¤er from the so-called simultaneity bias. Olley and Pakes (1996)
and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), henceforth OP and LP, have developed two similar semi-
parametric estimation procedures to overcome this problem using, respectively, investment and
material costs as instruments for the unobservable productivity shocks.
Since both methodologies have been employed in the literature, and both present some
shortcomings9, in principle it is correct to compute productivity through both approaches in
order to test the robustness of the TFP estimates. As shown in Figure 1, the distribution of
domestic rmsTFP as retrieved through both the LP (unrestricted sample) and OP (restricted
sample, positive investments) algorithms tend to overlap over the entire sampling period, once
normalizing the TFP of a given rm by the industry average (correlation of 0.8, signicantly
di¤erent from zero at the 1 per cent level). Hence, any bias in the estimation of TFP eventually
induced by the estimation technique can be ruled out, as long as our dependent variable is
considered in rst di¤erences10.
[Table 3 and Figure 1 about here]
We have therefore opted to use the TFP estimates of individual domestic rms retrieved
from the LP procedure, since the latter allows us to exploit all the data in our sample. Note
also that we have run our estimates for domestic rms only, thus avoiding the possibility that
the FDI status of a rm might have an e¤ect on the choice of input factors, another potential
source of bias in the estimates of productivity (Van Biesebroeck, 2005). Table 3 reports the
obtained production function coe¢ cients for a number of manufacturing and services industries.
Not surprisingly, the latter display higher coe¢ cients of the labour input, even after correcting
overestimation of productivity for rms operating in sectors which have higher returns. The shortcoming of
an industry-specic estimation is that, in a few cases (i.e. NACE16, 20), the number of rm-level observations
available for each industry has not allowed a proper identication of the input coe¢ cients. Accordingly, TFP
measures from rms belonging to these industries have not been considered in the follow-up of our exercise.
9The LP methodology has been criticized on the grounds that the conditional demand for materials itself
depends on the productivity shock, and thus materials are not a valid instrument to solve the simultaneity
bias. The OP methodology does not su¤er from the latter shortcoming, since the investment function is entirely
determined before the productivity shock takes places. However, a major assumption of the OP approach is the
existence of a strictly monotonous relationship between the instrument (investment) and output. This means that
any observation with zero or negative investment has to be dropped from the data, thus potentially inducing a
selection bias in the TFP estimation.
10Taking the dependent variable (TFP) in rst di¤erences also allows to control for the unobserved rm-specic
heterogeneity which may a¤ect the correlation between rm productivity and foreign presence (e.g. Smarzynska
Javorcik, 2004).
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for the simultaneity bias, since services are typically more labour intensive.
Another important source of distortion in the estimation of TFP, not yet fully tackled by the
spillovers literature, relates to the so-called omitted price variable bias in the measurement of
domestic rmsproductivity. Since the seminal paper of Klette and Griliches (1996), it is known
that proxying physical inputs and outputs through nominal variables deated by a broad price
index might lead to biased productivity measures, due to an omitted price variable bias induced
by the correlation between (unobserved) individual rmsprices and their used inputs11. Such a
bias can potentially a¤ect the estimated TFP, and hence the spillover analysis, in various ways.
On the one hand, inputs are positively correlated with the level of output, which is typically
negatively correlated with prices. If individual rm prices remain in the error term due to
improper deating, then the error term and the inputs are positively correlated, which yields
an underestimated coe¢ cient of labor and materials and thus distorted TFP estimates. On the
other hand, improper deating leads to a measurement error in the output variable: if prices
charged by domestic rms are below the industry average, e.g. because of lower quality with
respect to MNEs, the latter distortion will induce a downward bias in the estimated rms-specic
TFP, which in turn might lead to a spurious absence of horizontal spillovers12.
We assess these critiques in two ways: rst of all, we follow Katayama, Lu and Tybout (2003),
who argue that taking industry and region-specic averages on rm-specic TFP measures
allows to partially counter the omitted price variable bias, since the cross-producer variation in
productivity measures is much more problematic than the temporal variation of the population
of plants. In addition, following the spirit of Klette and Griliches (1996), we control for the degree
of imperfect competition on the demand side of the market allowing for spatial substitutability in
demand (e.g. as in Syverson, 2005), assuming that deviations of domestic rmsprices of outputs
and inputs (our measurement error) have a spatial component which can be controlled for. To
this extent, we develop a slightly modied version of the original Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
algorithm, estimating an industry-specic production function augmented with regional xed-
e¤ects, in order to pick up di¤erent pricing powers of domestic rms in the di¤erent Romanian
regions.
4.2 The measure of MNEspresence
In the traditional spillover regression, the presence of MNEs is measured through the ratio of
multinational employees over total employment in the considered industry z, region j and year t.
A positive and signicant coe¢ cient for the variable related to MNEs presence in the industry
11Eslava et al. (2004) discuss this issue in their analysis of productivity of Colombian rms, where they can
exploit the availability of rm-specic information on prices and quantities. DeLoecker (2007) provides a formal
econometric discussion of the omitted price variable bias.
12Starting from rmsi revenues Y expressed as quantities time prices, and considering PI as the industry
average price index, taking logs of the deated revenue we have yi   PI = qi + pi   PI . To the extent that
some domestic rms price below the industry average, we have that (pi  PI) < 0 and thus our observed deated
revenue yi   PI is downward biased, leading to a similar bias in the TFP measure.
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is then interpreted as evidence of horizontal spillovers13. A lag structure imposed on the MNE-
related variables allows to control for the potential endogeneity of the MNEspresence in the
selected region-industry pair.
A model design of this kind implies however that an equiproportional increase in the MNEs
employment and the total employment (thus yielding a constant share) will have no e¤ect on
domestic rmsproductivity. But if the absolute values of the elasticities of foreign and total
employment are di¤erent, Castellani and Zanfei (2006) have shown that using only the ratio of
foreign to total employment downwardly biases the estimate of the coe¢ cient, and might thus be
responsible for the lack of evidence on horizontal spillovers. As a result, we have compared the
standard model design, where spillovers are captured by the horizontal penetration index, with a
model design where the presence of MNEs is identied by the number of the same multinationals
operating in a given industry/region in a given year, controlling for the industry-specic average
investment size.
Moreover, contrary to standard practice, we have opted not to time-di¤erence the covariates
related to the MNEspresence. In fact, a di¤erence in di¤erence spillover regression imposes
the assumption that changes in productivity of domestic rms are driven only by changes in the
presence of MNEs, which is not necessarily true, since domestic rms might be a¤ected di¤erently
by the same stock of MNEs over time via learning (e.g. Liu, 2006). We thus explicitly control
for the learning hypothesis, by introducing in our regression the number of years since the rst
investment has taken place in a given industry/region.
4.3 The spillover regression
Our baseline model design is the standard spillover regression, relating domestic rmsTFP to
the presence of MNEs in the industry-region pair (Model 1):
 ln(TPFit) = + HPzjt 1 + z + j + t + "it (1)
In Equation (1),  ln(TPFit) is the change in the (log of) TFP of rm i at time t and HPzjt
is the index of horizontal penetration calculated as the ratio of multinational employees over
total employment in the considered industry z, region j and year t. As it is standard in the
literature, a positive and signicant  would be interpreted as evidence of horizontal spillovers.
Such a specication typically allows to tackle a number of econometric concerns. First of
all, as already discussed, the unobserved heterogeneity which may a¤ect the correlation between
rm productivity and foreign presence is controlled for by rst di¤erencing the (log of) TFP, i.e.
using  ln(TPFit) in order to wipe out unobserved rm-specic xed e¤ects, and by including
industry, region and time xed e¤ects z, j and t, respectively. Lagging one period the MNEs-
related variables allows us to control for the potential endogeneity of the MNEspresence in the
13Vertical spillovers would then be measured by weighting the horizontal penetration index with the input-
output coe¢ cients, as in Smarzynska Javorcik (2004).
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selected region-industry pair. Finally, since we perform a regression on micro units using mainly
aggregate variables as covariates (at the regional and industry level) it is common practice to
control for the potential downward bias in the estimated errors by clustering the standard errors
for all rm-level observations belonging to the same region-industry pair.
As already stated, such a model design implies, however, that an equiproportional increase
in MNEspresence and total employment will have no e¤ect on domestic rmsproductivity,
which might bias downwardly the estimate of the spillover coe¢ cient. To counter this possible
criticism, we compare the previous model with the following regression equation (Model 2):
 ln(TPFit) = Dzjt 1 + Dzjt 1CumFDIzjt 1 + z + j + t + "it (2)
where again  ln(TPFit) is the change in the (log) of TFP of rm i at time t, Dzjt 1 is a
dummy variable related to the change in the number of MNEs taking value 1 if an investment is
undertaken in industry z of region j in year t  1, and CumFDIzjt 1 is the cumulated number
(in logs) of foreign investments in industry z of region j at time t   1. The coe¢ cient  thus
captures the average e¤ect of a change in the horizontal MNEspresence, while the coe¢ cient
, which refers to the interaction of the investment dummy Dzjt 1 with the cumulated number
of FDI, captures the marginal e¤ects on domestic rmsTFP. The implicit assumption in this
model design is that we treat all foreign investments as equal, since no weights are assigned to
the value of investments14. However, all econometric specications are sector-specic, so that
di¤erences in the size of investment across sectors (which account for the largest part of variation
in rmsvalues) are controlled for. In addition, we will provide a robustness check of our results
controlling in what follows for the minimum e¢ cient scale.
Given our equation (2), a positive horizontal spillover from MNEs entry on the average
change in domestic productivity is obtained, in principle, when + CumFDIzjt 1 > 015. The
ratio ^
^
derived from our model design is then a useful statistic to test the relevance of a FDI
threshold around which the marginal e¤ect on domestic rmsTFP change sign. In particular,
the critical value of the number of foreign investors that determines the sign of the aggregate
spillover can be calculated setting  + CumFDIzjt 1 = 0. E.g., if  > 0,  < 0 and   is
signicantly di¤erent from 0, there exists a threshold value CumFDI =   of FDI below
which aggregate spillovers are positive. Spillovers then become negative as soon as MNEsentry
crosses the threshold.
As already hinted, an econometric concern in the previous specication is related to the na-
ture of CumFDI, a count variable which in principle treats as equal FDI in di¤erent industries,
i.e. MNEs which are likely to be characterized by di¤erent rmssizes. If there is a systematic
14The average capital of foreign rms (proxied by total xed assets) in our sample is around 2 million euros, but
with a large standard deviation. The same is true for employment (average of 259 employees). Also note that,
given our sector classication, we have excluded from our sample all foreign a¢ iliates acting only as promotion
agencies or sales representatives.
15Note that when assessing the overall impact of spillover as  + CumFDIijt 1, the coe¢ cient  can be
interpreted as the e¤ect of the rst investment on domestic rmsTFP changes.
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di¤erence over time in the size of MNEs which enter in each industry, ignoring it might lead
to potential spurious correlations, not entirely captured by our xed-e¤ects. However, having
calculated the median size of the MNEs that have entered in each industry in each year, we can
rule out specic trends over time in this variable, and thus we conjecture that our results are not
driven by particular dynamics of specic industries. Finally, the cumulated number of foreign
investments is a variable increasing over time, and hence non-stationary. Although the variable
enters in our specication always interacted with the investment dummy and time-e¤ects are
included in our regression, we could still get a positive spurious relation between TFP and for-
eign presence, as well as problems with the asymptotic properties of our estimators, if there is
serial correlation in the error terms. Though the econometric literature in general acknowledges
(e.g. Baltagi, 2001) that the problem is negligible in micro panels such as ours, characterized
by a large number of cross-sectional units (48*8 in our case) with respect to time (6 years), we
report the modied version of the Durbin-Watson statistic for balanced panels, as proposed by
Bhargava et al. (1982), in order to assess the extent of the problem for each model specication.
To counter the omitted price variable bias and measure the impact of the MNEspresence on
the average domestic rm, we have introduced a third model design (equation 3), aggregating
rm-specic TFP measures across the 48 industries and 8 regions over the years 1995-2001, thus
using as a dependent variable the average TFP of industry z and region j at time t calculated
over individual rms
 ln(TPF zjt) = Dzjt 1 + Dzjt 1CumFDIzjt 1 + z + j + t + "zjt (3)
where  ln(TPF zjt) is the average change of (log) domestic rmsTFP in industry z and region
j in year t. As we have argued, the latter treatment of the dependent variable yields us a
balanced panel across industries, regions and years, and allows us to minimize potential biases
in our TFP measure deriving from the heterogeneity in the mark-ups faced by individual rms.
As a further renement, we have specied an industry-specic threshold CumFDIz , in line
with earlier studies suggesting industry-specic spillover e¤ects (Liu et al., 2000) and spillover
e¤ects that are moderated by a measure of absorptive capacity (Sinani and Meyer, 2004). More-
over, as already discussed, a shortcoming of the previous specications is that FDI undertaken
in industries characterized by di¤erent average rm sizes, and thus di¤erent barriers to entry,
are treated as equal. We have thus rened our model specication so that the threshold depends
on MESz, the minimum e¢ cient scale16 of industry z, as follows (Model 4):
 ln(TPF zjt) = Dzjt 1 + Dzjt 1
CumFDIzjt 1
MESz
+ z + j + t + "zjt (4)
Interacting CumFDI and MES in the proposed way essentially implies to assign greater
weight to those FDI undertaken in industries characterized by lower barriers of entry (lower
16The minimum e¢ cient scale has been calculated as the median employment of the rms in each industry.
11
MES). We can therefore control for the industries in which the competition e¤ect from MNEs
should be a priori stronger. Moreover, in the already quoted paper by Aitken and Harrison
(1999), it is claimed that one should distinguish between large and small domestic rms, since
it is more likely that industries characterized by larger rms will possess a su¢ cient level of
absorptive capacity to benet from the presence of FDI. The intuition explored in equation (4)
is that industries characterized by larger rms (i.e. a higher MES) should exhibit a higher critical
threshold level of FDI after which their spillover becomes negative. Interacting CumFDI and
MES as reported yields in fact a critical value of the (industry-specic) threshold CumFDIz =
 MESz.
Finally, to include an intercept in the latter linear relationship for the threshold, we can
generalize the model design as (Model 5)
 ln(TPF zjt) = Dzjt 1 + Dzjt 1
CumFDIzjt 1
MESz
+ Dzjt 1
1
MESz
+ z + j + t + "zjt (5)
so that the threshold becomes CumFDIz =  MESz    . In this case, we can then explicitly
design a test statistic for both the coe¢ cient of our functional form,  , and its intercept


17.
The next section discusses the results of the various model specications plus some additional
control variables.
5 Empirical results and robustness
Our baseline results are presented in Table 4. In the rst column we test the benchmark model
of horizontal spillovers to domestic rms using rm-specic productivity measures (Model 1).
In line with the recent literature, we do not nd signicant e¤ects18. In column 2 we test
for the existence of a possible FDI threshold (Model 2), always using domestic rm-specic
productivity measures: we nd a negative and signicant (at 10 per cent) sign of the interaction
between Dzjt 1 and CumFDI, thus indicating that the e¤ects on domestic rmsproductivity
tend to change as the number of multinational increases. The critical value for the existence of
the FDI threshold,   , is positive but not signicantly di¤erent from 0. To assess whether our
results are to a certain extent driven by a possible omitted price variable bias, in columns 3 and
4 we test again the two models, this time using the average productivity changes  ln(TPF zjt)
as our dependent variable (Model 3). Again, we nd positive but not signicant horizontal
spillovers when tested through the standard specication (column 3), but signicant threshold
e¤ects (column 4). Having controlled for all other potential biases, the latter result might thus
explain the lack of signicance of horizontal spillovers when tested through traditional model
17Since the restrictions to test are non-linear, the test is based on a Wald statistic (2-distributed) constructed
through the estimated covariance matrix obtained from the unrestricted (linear) models (Greene, 2003, p. 176).
18We have also tested for backward and forward linkages, as in Smarzynska Javorcik (2004), nding weak
evidence of vertical spillovers.
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designs.
[Table 4 about here]
In Table 5 we further explore this nding through our rened model designs explicitly testing
for the existence of the FDI threshold. For a matter of comparison, column 1 replicates the last
column of Table 4. As already discussed, we nd that FDI undertaken at time t   1 has a
positive and signicant impact on the average productivity changes in a given industry/region,
providing evidence of positive horizontal spillovers. More specically, the estimate for  reveals
that, on average, the rst foreign investment in a specic sector and region increases domestic
TFP by almost 3.5%. The e¤ect however decreases as the number of foreign investment inows
increases (negative sign of the interaction between Dzjt 1 and CumFDI). The critical value,
  , is positive and signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 5% level of signicance. In particular, the
threshold indicates that negative spillovers arise on average from the 12th investment on. The
modied Durbin-Watson statistic is very close to 2 across all model specications, indicating no
problems of serial correlation in the error terms.
Nevertheless, in the previous model specication the estimate for  is not signicantly di¤er-
ent from 0, probably due to the industry-specic nature of . In fact, interacting the cumulated
number of FDI with the inverse of minimum e¢ cient scale, calculated as the rmsmedian em-
ployment in each industry, highly reduces the industry heterogeneity and yields signicant re-
sults, thus conrming our hypothesis (Model 4) of the existence of an industry-specic threshold
CumFDIz =  MESz. Column 2 of the Table shows that  is still positive and signicant,
while  is now also signicantly di¤erent from 0. Not surprisingly, our test statistic for the
threshold   remains positive and signicant.
In order to check whether in our expression for the industry-specic threshold we have
omitted an intercept term, we have also included in the regression the term Dzjt 1 1MESz ,
which implies a threshold CumFDIz =  MESz    (Model 5). To avoid multicollinearity,
we have instrumented 1MESz , the (inverse of) the industry-specic MES, with
1
MESzj
, i.e. the
(inverse of) MES calculated for each industry z and region j. The results are reported in column
3. Again, both  and  are signicant, as it is our test statistic   > 0, thus indicating the
presence of a threshold e¤ect. We cannot instead reject the hypothesis that the intercept,    ,
equals zero at conventional levels of signicance.
[Table 5 about here]
In column 4 we explicitly test for the learning hypothesis as discussed by Liu (2006),
introducing in our benchmark model of the FDI threshold a variable T measuring the (log)
number of years since the rst foreign investment took place in a given industry/region. The
latter allows us to counter a possible omitted variable bias arising from the fact that, if the
investment dummy Dzjt 1 is zero in our specication, the change in productivity of our domestic
rm would not be a function of previous investment. As it can be seen, the variable is signicant
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and negatively signed, while the estimates of  and  do not change, as well as the signicance
of our test statistic for the threshold   > 0. Hence, ceteris paribus domestic rms seem to
experience a marginally decreasing change in productivity as time from the rst investment
goes by, consistent with the ndings of Gri¢ th et al. (2002) who found that there might be
a convergence in total factor productivity of domestic rms towards the foreign ones, with the
rate of productivity growth decreasing over time as more MNEs enter in the local market.
Finally, in column 5 we test whether spillovers vary between the manufacturing and services
sector. In our sample, services constitute around 13% of our observations (see the Statistical
Annex for a list of industries, including services). To that extent, we introduce a dummy SERV
taking value one if the considered industry belongs to the services sector, and interact the dummy
with the variables driving the threshold.
While the main e¤ects remain unchanged for the manufacturing sector, including the signif-
icance of our test statistic for the threshold, the e¤ects for services are di¤erent. In particular,
in services the positive impact of the rst investment on domestic rms remains positive but is
diminished by 3.8 percentage points, while the negative e¤ect induced by the increasing presence
of MNEs is increased by some 39 percentage points, thus turning positive. Thus, the estimated
coe¢ cients for  and  are both positive in the case of services, but not signicantly di¤erent
from zero19. We also nd that the FDI threshold   is not signicantly di¤erent from zero
for the services sector, implying that the main results we found are driven by the behavior of
spillover in manufacturing industries.
Our interpretation of these results is that, overall, there seems to exist a general pattern of
spillovers from FDI where productivity is boosted in the year immediately after the investment
has taken place (positive ), but then gradually decreases through both the changes in market
structure (negative ), and the convergence to the frontier of domestic rms, which seem to learn
marginally less as time goes by (as in Gri¢ th et al., 2002). The results are however di¤erent in
the services sector, leading to no FDI threshold in these industries20.
Table 6 presents a number of additional robustness checks of our ndings, always controlling
for the number of years since the rst foreign investment took place in a given industry/region
to avoid a possible omitted variable bias. In column 1, we specically control for the actual
number of foreign rms entering in a given sector/region and year, since it may be the case that
multiple entries in a given year would a¤ect di¤erently the performance of domestic rms with
respect to the case of a single FDI. Our variable INVzjt 1 measures the total number of foreign
investment undertaken in industry z of region j in year t  1 (taken as the log of 1 plus the
number of foreign investments). We maintain the interaction with our measure of FDI stock
19Denoting S and S the coe¢ cients for Dzjt 1 Serv and Dzjt 1 CumFDIzjt 1MESz Serv respectively, the Chi-sq.
and p-values of the test Ho:  + S = 0 and Ho:  + S = 0 are 0.03 (.85) and 0.02 (.88), as retrieved from
Column 5 of Table 5.
20Albeit not signicant, the combined e¤ects of our estimates for  and  in services would point in the direction
of positive spillovers, consistent with the ndings of Vahter and Masso (2007), who, using a similar semi-parametric
measure of TFP, nd some evidence of higher spillovers in services industry with respect to manufacturing in
Estonia.
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CumFDI, in order to keep the same interpretation of the threshold value, and we always control
for the average investment size MES. The results are unchanged, with the value of our test
statistic for the threshold more than doubled.
Following the related literature (e.g. Sinani and Meyer, 2004), as a further robustness check
we have augmented our benchmark specication with the Herndahl index calculated for both
domestic and foreign rms (column 2a) or for domestic rms only (column 2b). We have also
included a proxy for domestic rmsabsorptive capacity, measured as the average investment in
intangible assets over total assets in a given industry/region, and introduced a control for the
stock of FDI cumulated at the beginning of our observation period (column 3). We do not nd
signicant e¤ects of the Herndahl index or the initial FDI stock on the domestic rmsaverage
TFP, while the absorptive capacity index is positive and signicant, in line with other results
obtained in the literature (e.g. Damijan et al., 2003)21. As it can be seen, our estimates of 
and  are very robust to these di¤erent model specications, as well as our hypothesis of a zero
intercept term in our threshold expression.
Finally, as a further robustness check, we have recalculated our estimates using a di¤erent
measure of domestic rmsTFP, and namely the one retrieved by estimating an industry-specic
production function augmented with regional xed-e¤ects, in order to pick up di¤erent pricing
powers of domestic rms in the di¤erent Romanian regions. The results, presented in column 4,
show that the threshold   remains signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to perform a robustness check of the threshold e¤ect
with respect to a change in our denition of foreign ownership (10 per cent of capital stock,
following the o¢ cial IMF denition of foreign investment, as it is common in most studies).
Nevertheless, we can draw on results from Spatareanu and Smarzynska Javorcik (2006), who, on
a similar sample of Romanian rms from 1998 to 2000, show that positive horizontal spillovers
are likely to increase with the percentage of foreign ownership. Hence, we expect the threshold
to increase when a more restrictive denition of foreign ownership (i.e. majority or wholly-owned
investment) is considered.
[Table 6 about here]
Reinterpreting our exercise in a policy perspective, we have exploited the estimates of  and
 reported in column 2 of Table 5 to calculate the FDI thresholds. Given the model design,
the results, reported in Table 7, present the industry-specic thresholds of FDI for the average
region. For example, Table 2 shows that the cumulated FDI in the pharmaceutical industry
(NACE 243-245) equals to 35 investments for the entire country. Since this gure is lower
than the average region-specic threshold retrieved in Table 7 (56), the pharmaceutical industry
21The industry average proxy for absorptive capacity ranges across domestic rms in our sample from 0.1 per
cent (car production) to 6.9 per cent (computer industry).
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appears to be a sector where domestic rms can still benet from inward FDI.
[Table 7 about here]
Table 7 also allows us to characterize industries according to their desiderability in terms of
spillovers potential. Recalling the Pavitt classication of industries reported in the Statistical
Annex, it is possible to calculate common thresholds for the di¤erent industrial groups by taking
averages of the relevant industries. In particular, we obtain that policy makers should try to
attract FDI in industries characterized by economies of scale, since the latter have the highest
FDI treshold, 25 investments for the average region. On the contrary, traditional, labour-
intensive manufacturing industries have the lowest threshold (3)22. Quite surprisingly, high-tech
industries do not display a particularly high threshold, and thus do not seem particularly suited
to generating sustained spillovers for the receiving country/region. We discuss our intuition for
the latter result in our concluding remarks.
6 Managerial implications and further lines of research
Our analysis conrms that, in the case of Romania, there exists a (industry-specic) threshold
of MNEs driving the results of aggregate spillovers. We can thus conclude that the concept of
marginalspillovers becomes relevant, i.e. the combined e¤ects of positive horizontal spillover
and competition on domestic rmsTFP are not constant, but rather varying with the progres-
sive entry of new MNEs, with initially positive e¤ects turning negative with the increase in the
presence of multinationals. As a result, if horizontal spillovers measures are combined in a single
coe¢ cient, measuring the average impact over time of the MNEspresence on the productivity
of domestic rms, as the current literature has been doing, it is likely that the same coe¢ cient
is not signicant, since the model design fails to take into account the changes in the market
structure induced by the continuous entry of MNEs.
In terms of managerial implications, our results do not exclude that the presence of MNEs
can prima facie benet domestic rms. Actually, we do nd a spillover e¤ect for the initial
investments in a given region / industry. However, we also provide robust evidence that, after a
given threshold in the FDI presence, the spillover e¤ect is outweighed by a marginally decreasing
role of learning, as domestic rms convergence to the technology frontier (e.g. Gri¢ th et al.,
2002), and by a negative competition e¤ect. As far as the latter is concerned, the negative
impact of an increasing MNEspresence on domestic rmsproductivity can be consistent with
the traditional market-stealing e¤ect identied by the international business literature (e.g.
Buckley et al., 2007). In fact, if we assume that foreign entry crowds out market shares of
domestic rms, the latter would experience a reduction of their economies of scale, and thus of
22Consistently with our previous results, the threshold for services as retrieved from Column 5 of Table 5 turns
out to be negative and not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
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their TFP, with the e¤ect becoming immediately evident in industries were economies of scale are
relatively low. Consistently, we have indeed found that industries relatively more characterized
by economies of scale display the highest FDI threshold. Scale and market stealing e¤ects are
known to be di¤erent in the services sector (Capar and Kotabe, 2003), and can thus also justify
the di¤erent results we obtain for services industries vs. manufacturing ones.
However, our results also point to a di¤erent channel driving negative spillovers, more di-
rectly related to the strategic choices in the international allocation of (tangible and intangible)
assets by MNEs. In fact, what remains to be explained is the quite surprising result of a low
FDI threshold in industries characterized by a certain degree of R&D intensity. A possible
explanation involves strategic decisions of technology transfers by MNEs which enter the do-
mestic market. In Blalock and Gertler (2007) it is indeed shown that MNEs might initially
have an incentive to di¤use technology to their suppliers in order to avoid a hold-up problem.
However, since the MNE cannot prevent the upstream suppliers from selling also to the multi-
nationals competitors in the downstream market, too much competition might induce the same
MNE to strategically reduce its degree of technology transfers. Belderbos et al. (2005) also
nd that the decision to invest in R&D in a foreign country by a MNE a¤ects negatively the
location decision of similar activities by a rival MNE. Cantwell and Santangelo (2002) provide
some empirical evidence consistent with this behaviour, since they nd that MNEs operating
in the same (electronics) industry tend to separate geographically their co-specialised research,
while inter-industry cooperation entails the co-location of related research. Finally, Alcacer and
Chung (2007) nd that, while less technologically advanced rms favor locations with high levels
of industrial innovative activity, technologically advanced rms choose only locations with high
levels of academic activity and avoid locations with industrial activity to distance themselves
from competitors.
Nesting these results into ours, we could therefore claim that the decrease in the importance
of horizontal spillovers associated with an increasing presence of MNEs might derive also from
a technological channel, since our results are consistent with strategic choices of MNEs in which
the technological transfer is interrupted after a certain number of rivalsentries.
In terms of policy implications, the study therefore suggests that FDI attraction policies
should focus on sectors where the marginal e¤ect of foreign entry is positive, typically industries
characterized by high economies of scale, as from our Table 7 for Romania. In sectors where
the number of cumulated FDI is still below the calculated threshold, the spillover e¤ect is
likely to outweigh the competition e¤ect and benets for the productivity of local rms might
be expected. In industries characterized by lower critical FDI thresholds, instead, any new
FDI entering the market risks aggravating negative spillovers to domestic rms. Moreover,
if we acknowledge that negative spillovers might also derive from strategic choices of MNEs
linked to the risk of knowledge appropriation by rivals, adequate and e¤ective policies protecting
intellectual property rights might also play a signicant role in magnifying positive spillovers for
domestic rms.
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Clearly, while all these explanations are ex post consistent with our results, a thorough
examination of these possible channels leading to di¤erentiated spillover e¤ects is left to a future
research agenda.
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Table 1. The evolution of the panel of Romanian firms. Sample vs. official data 
 
Year Number of firms Entry Rate Exit Rate 
 Dom MNEs Total 
MNEs 
penetration Sample Official Sample Official 
1995 4764 1217 5981 0.20     
1996 5449 1504 6953 0.22 0.19 0.11 0.01 0.09 
1997 5898 1653 7551 0.22 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.07 
1998 6389 1896 8285 0.23 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.07 
1999 6957 2121 9078 0.23 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.06 
2000 7331 2603 9934 0.26 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.09 
2001 7605 3045 10650 0.29 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.10 
Source: authors’ elaboration on the basis of AMADEUS dataset and Romanian Chamber of Commerce for 
official data. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of estimated domestic firms’ productivity: O-P vs. L-P a 
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Note: TFP index of individual domestic firms for the period 1995-2001, normalized to industry average in a 
given year. O-P estimates are performed on the restricted sample (only domestic firms displaying positive 
investments), while the LP estimates are performed over the entire sample for the corresponding industries. 
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Table 2. Cumulative FDI in Romania, 1990-2001. 
NACE Stock 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
10,14 2 13 24 31 36 42 48 49 
151,152 0 6 11 19 21 24 27 29 
153,155 0 10 17 26 30 39 44 49 
156 0 4 12 19 20 21 21 30 
157 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 4 
158 0 27 42 61 87 94 106 112 
159 6 10 21 24 32 35 39 40 
16 0 0 1 2 5 6 7 7 
17 1 9 28 54 77 97 109 124 
18 4 17 49 80 122 153 180 204 
19 0 9 22 39 57 66 83 97 
20 1 17 43 80 113 142 172 192 
21 0 3 11 14 22 27 33 34 
22 0 14 27 39 52 64 70 71 
241,242 2 5 13 15 22 27 28 29 
243,245 2 6 10 16 22 26 31 35 
246,247 1 1 2 2 5 7 7 8 
251 0 3 4 6 7 8 8 9 
252,262 0 6 16 32 45 53 68 77 
26 1 7 14 21 29 34 41 46 
27 3 4 7 10 21 26 30 33 
28 1 8 18 43 55 70 85 101 
291 0 1 2 4 5 7 9 10 
292 0 1 2 5 8 10 11 12 
293 0 1 2 2 5 5 5 5 
294,295 2 4 9 13 15 17 21 27 
297 0 0 2 3 3 3 4 4 
30 0 3 6 12 14 15 18 21 
31 2 6 10 14 21 29 33 47 
321 0 0 1 3 5 5 7 10 
322,323 1 3 3 5 7 8 11 12 
331,332 0 1 2 4 4 6 6 9 
334,335 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 3 
341 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
343 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
351 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
352,354 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
361,362 1 5 16 31 43 48 59 74 
363,365 1 2 2 3 7 9 9 10 
366 0 1 3 10 15 18 25 30 
40 0 0 3 5 7 7 8 10 
45 2 19 47 91 144 171 202 224 
55 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
642 2 2 2 6 6 6 6 6 
65,66 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
92 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Source: authors’ elaboration on the basis of the AMADEUS dataset. See Annex for details on the classification 
of industries. NACE industries 72 and 73 did not report any multinational investment. 
 23
Table 3. A comparison of productivity estimates in a sample of industries 
 
NACE2 Industry Food Automotive Wood products 
Rubber and 
Plastics 
Lev Pet (2003) ln (labor) 0.0257*** 0.0552*** 0.0578*** 0.0603*** 
 ln (materials) 0.8436*** 0.9756*** 0.8547*** 0.7672*** 
 ln (capital) 0.0858*** 0.1617*** 0.0803*** 0.1021*** 
OLS ln (labor) 0.1494*** 0.2184*** 0.2653*** 0.2823*** 
 ln (materials) 0.9199*** 0.9224*** 0.8992*** 0.8927*** 
 ln (capital) 0.0019 -0.0238 0.0017 -0.0261*** 
 OLS bias in labor coeff. + + +  +
 OLS bias in material coeff. + - -  +
 OLS bias in capital coeff. not sign. not sign. not sign.  -
 N. of domestic firms 6880 360 3172  1276
 
NACE2 Industry 
Metal 
Products 
Construction 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 
Telecom 
Lev Pet (2003) ln (labor) 0.111*** 0.1270*** 0.1995*** 0.2124*** 
 ln (materials) 0.8939*** 0.7120*** 0.7010*** 0.8772*** 
 ln (capital) 0.0831** 0.1382*** 0.0659 0.0049 
OLS ln (labor) 0.3098*** 0.3601*** 0.3898*** 0.5697*** 
 ln (materials) 0.8774*** 0.8201*** 0.7575*** 0.7101*** 
 ln (capital) -0.0392*** -0.0097** 0.0468*** 0.0468*** 
 OLS bias in labor coeff. + + +  +
 OLS bias in material coeff. - + +  -
 OLS bias in capital coeff. - - not sign.  not sign.
 N. of domestic firms 2821 8697 812  721
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Table 4. Horizontal spillovers from FDI 
(Levinsohn-Petrin semi-parametric estimates of TFP) 
Dependent var. 
 
Firm-specific 
Δln(TFP) 
Firm-specific 
Δln(TFP) 
Industry/region 
avg. Δln(TFP) 
Industry/region 
avg. Δln(TFP) 
HPt-1 .007 (.009) - 
.008 
(.016) - 
Dt-1 - .008 (.008) - 
.03* 
(.02) 
Dt-1*Cumfdit-1 - -.007* (.004) - 
-.014 
(.012) 
48 Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8 Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
6 Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq.  .32 .31 .26 .26 
N. of obs. 31068 31068 1802 1802 
Spillover test statistic a 
Χ 2 - 2.00  4.38** 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.  
*, ** or ***: significant at the 10, 5 or 1 per cent level respectively. 
(a) Ho: α/β=0 given α Dt-1 + β Dt-1*Cumfdit-1 
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Table 5. Threshold effects from incremental FDI 
 
Dep var.: Industry/region avg. Δln(TFP) with Levinsohn-Petrin semi-parametric estimates of productivity) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dt-1 .034* (.02) 
.035** 
(.02) 
.056*** 
(.02) 
.066*** 
(.02) 
.056** 
(.02) 
Dt-1*Cumfdit-1 -.015 (.01)     
Dt-1*Cumfdit-1/MES  -.25* (.15) 
-.26* 
(.15) 
-.29** 
(.14) 
-.31** 
(.15) 
Dt-1/MES   -.22* (.13) 
-.22* 
(.13) 
-.06 
(.17) 
Time since 1st FDI    -.02** (.01) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
SERV*Dt-1     -.04 (.09) 
SERV*[Dt-1*Cumfdit-1/MES]     .39 (.59) 
SERV*[Dt-1/MES]     -.29 (.27) 
48 Industry dummies 83.08*** 79.85*** 80.25*** 84.79*** 79.94*** 
8 Regional dummies 4.63 4.50 4.58 5.65 5.51 
6 Time dummies 46.64*** 48.88*** 44.67*** 47.52*** 47.70*** 
R-sq.  .26 .27 .27 .27 .27 
N. of obs. 1802 1802 1802 1802 1802 
Modified Durbin-Watson 
serial correlation test 
1.92 
(ρ=0.04) 
1.92 
(ρ=0.04) 
1.91 
(ρ=0.05) 
1.92 
(ρ=0.04) 
1.92 
(ρ=0.04) 
Threshold test statistic a 
Χ 2 4.38** 5.80** 5.23** 6.15** 5.37** 
Intercept test statistic b 
Χ 2 - - 1.62 1.75 0.14 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Joint significance tests for industry, region and time dummies. 
*, ** or ***: significant at the 10, 5 or 1 per cent level respectively. 
(a) Ho: α/β=0 given α Dt-1 + β Dt-1*Cumfdit-1 (Column 1) and α Dt-1 + β Dt-1*Cumfdit-1/MES (Columns 2-5) 
(b) Ho: γ/β=0 given α Dt-1 + β Dt-1*Cumfdit-1/MES + γ Dt-1/MES  
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Table 6. Threshold effects from incremental FDI – Robustness checks 
 
Dep var.: Industry/region avg. Δln(TFP) with Levinsohn-Petrin semi-parametric estimates of productivity) 
 
 
(1) (2a) (2b) (3) (4) 
INVt-1 .060** (.02)     
INVt-1*Cumfdit-1/MES -.28** (.12)     
INVt-1/MES -.16 (.12)     
Dt-1  .066*** (.02) 
.066*** 
(.02) 
.068*** 
(.02) 
.040** 
(.02) 
Dt-1*Cumfdit-1/MES  -.28* (.15) 
-.29* 
(.15) 
-.28* 
(.15) 
-.19* 
(.12) 
Dt-1/MES  -.22* (.13) 
-.22* 
(.13) 
-.25* 
(.13) 
-.11 
(.11) 
Time since 1st FDI -.02** 
(.01) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
-.01 
(.01) 
Herfindal (all firms)  -.004 (.03)  
-.005 
(.03) 
 
Herfindal (dom. firms)   .006 (.03)  
 
FDI Stock 1994    .018 (.02) 
 
Absorptive capacity    .17* (.09) 
 
48 Sector dummies 85.16*** 84.31*** 84.91*** 83.73*** 217.1*** 
8 Regional dummies 5.27 5.62 5.65 6.46 6.17 
6 Time dummies 47.49*** 46.32*** 47.35*** 45.44*** 71.98*** 
R-sq.  .27 .27 .28 .30 .52 
N. of obs. 1802 1802 1802 1802 1792 
Modified Durbin-Watson 
serial correlation test 
1.92 
(ρ=0.04) 
1.92 
(ρ=0.05) 
1.92 
(ρ=0.05) 
1.92 
(ρ=0.04) 
2.06 
(ρ=-0.02) 
Threshold test a 
Χ 2 16.18*** 6.06** 6.18** 5.81** 4.18** 
Intercept test statistic b 
Χ 2 1.88 1.74 1.76 1.95 0.83 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Joint significance tests for sector, region and time dummies. 
*, ** or ***: significant at the 10, 5 or 1 per cent level respectively.  
Column (4): Modified Levinsohn-Petrin semi-parametric TFP estimates augmented with regional fixed-effects 
(a) Ho: α/β=0 given α INVt-1 + β INVt-1*Cumfdit-1/MES (Column 1) and α Dt-1 + β Dt-1*Cumfdit-1/MES 
(Columns 2-5) 
(b) Ho: γ/β=0 given α INVt-1 + β INVt-1*Cumfdit-1/MES + γ INVt-1/MES (Column 1) and   
 α Dt-1 + β Dt-1*Cumfdit-1/MES + γ Dt-1/MES (Columns 2-5) 
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Table 7. Industry-specific FDI thresholds for positive spillovers in the average region 
 
Nace CumFDI*  Nace CumFDI*  Industry Type CumFDI* 
10,14 1  292 4  Economies of Scale 25 
151,152 2  293 4  Traditional 3 
153,155 2  294,295 5  Specialized 13 
156 2  297 2  High Tech 9 
157 9  30 3  Services - 
158 2  31 31    
159 3  321 14    
16 3  322,323 89    
17 3  331,332 104    
18 3  334,335 23    
19 3  341 2    
20 2  343 2    
21 2  351 93    
22 2  352,354 39    
241,242 3  361,362 2    
243,245 56  363,365 4    
246,247 21  366 3    
251 18  40 3    
252,262 2  45 1    
26 3  55 -    
27 14  642 -    
28 2  65,66 -    
291 2  92 -    
Note: CumFDI* = -α∗ΜΕS/β - γ/β as retrieved from Column 5, Table 5. The threshold for services CumFDIS* = 
(α+αS)∗ΜΕS/(β+βS) – (γ+γS)/(β+βS) as retrieved from Column 5, Table 5, turns out to be negative. 
See the Statistical Annex for the definition of the NACE codes and industry classification. 
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Statistical Annex – Classification of industries 
The model includes a total of 48 NACE 2 and 3 digits industries, grouped as follows: 
Economies of scale industries: 10-11-12-13 and 14 (mining of coal, metals and stone; extraction of petroleum 
and natural gas); 21 (paper and pulp); 22 (publishing and press); 241 and 242 (basic chemicals and agro-
chemicals); 246 and 247 (other chemical products and synthetic fibres); 251 (rubber products); 26 (other non-
metallic products); 27 (metallurgy); 297 (domestic appliances); 31 (electrical appliances, excluding domestic); 
321 (electronics); 322 and 323 (communication equipment); 341 (car production); 343 (car components); 351 
(ship building); 352 and 354 (railways; motorcycles); 40 (energy);  
Traditional industries: 151 and 152 (production and transformation of meat and fish); 153 and 155 (vegetables, 
milk and dairy products); 156 (grains); 157 (pet food); 158 (fabrication of bread, tea, coffee); 159 (drink and 
beverages); 16 (tobacco); 17 (textiles); 18 (clothing); 19 (leather); 20 (wood); 28 (metals); 361 and 362 
(furniture); 363 and 365 (musical instruments and toys); 366 (other general manufacturing);  
Specialized industries; 252 and 262 (plastic products); 291 (mechanical machinery); 292 (general machinery); 
293 (agricultural machines); 294 and 295 (machine tools); 334 and 335 (optics, photography, clocks); 45 
(construction) 
High-tech industries: 243 and 245 (paintings and pharmaceuticals); 244 (pharmaceuticals); 30 (office machines 
and computers); 331 and 332 (medical and precision instruments); 642 (telecommunication) 
Services: 55 (hotels and restaurants); 65 and 66 (financial intermediation and insurance); 72 (computer and 
related activities); 73 (research and development); 92 (cultural and sporting activities) 
Appendix: Data sources and issues
Balance sheet data of domestic rms as well as information on the presence of MNEs have been retrieved by
the AMADEUS dataset, commercially available from the Bureau Van Dijck (www.bvdep.com). The latter is a
comprehensive, pan-European database developed by a consulting rm, Bureau van Dijck. It contains balance
sheet data in time series on 7 million public and private companies in 38 European countries (2004 edition). The
dataset comes as a modular product: a version including the top 250,000 companies, the top 1.5 million (employed
in this paper) or all 7 million companies in the considered countries. When using these data, three issues are
worth pointing out:
1. The available datasets tend to exclude small rms (mainly domestic) from the records, and thus yield a
lower proportion of domestic rms vs. multinationals with respect to the Romanian population of rms.
The latter issue does not necessarily distort our spillover measure, since while it is true that smaller rms
could be characterized, in principle, by a lower absorptive capacity of technological spillovers, they also
tend to grow faster in terms of productivity. Since we use TFP changes as our control variable, the latter
entails a conservative measure of productivity.
2. In AMADEUS the information on ownership is recorded only for the last available year (2000 or 2001),
thus implying that some of the rms that we consider as foreign in 2001 might have been domestic in the
years before. In order to gauge the magnitude of this issue, we have compared di¤erent yearly releases
of AMADEUS, nding that, given a MNE in year 2000 or 2001, there is a 15 per cent chance that the
same rm is a domestic one before that year, while the probability of the opposite event (a rm switching
from MNE to domestic) is negligible. The issue is however not critical for our exercise, since the aim is
to test the impact of the entry of MNEs on the average productivity of a sample of domestic rms. If
we incorrectly attribute the multinational status to that 15 per cent of rms which sometime before 2001
were still domestic, we de facto exclude them from our dependent variable (domestic rmsTFP). The
latter exclusion leads to a more conservative TFP measure, if we assume that MNEs acquire the most
productive domestic rms (Arnold and Javorcik, 2005). Moreover, considering as MNEs some rms which
for a certain number of years have remained domestic would lead to a more modest spillover e¤ect, as
we expect domestic entry to have a lower impact on domestic productivity than foreign entry. Thus, if
anything, these potential measurement errors would lead to a more conservative assessment of the spillover
e¤ect.
3. In terms of entry and exit dynamics of both domestic and foreign rms, the entry rate retrieved from
our sample (see Table 1) matches very closely the o¢ cial entry rate recorded by the Romanian Chamber
of Commerce in the considered period. The lower exit rate reported in our sample is likely due to the
large-rm bias of the dataset, since in transition economies larger rms on average tend to benet from
softer budget constraints and display higher survival rates than small rms. Again, the latter issue does
not a¤ect our exercise: if soft budget constraints play a role, then our TFP is measured conservatively,
because the selection e¤ect driving out ine¢ cient domestic rms works less intensively.
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